In this paper, we prove that it is NP-complete to decide whether two bimatrix games share a common Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, it is co-NP-hard to decide whether two bimatrix games have exactly the same set of Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical model to study and predict the behaviors and interactions of rational decision makers. Noncooperative game [1] is guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium. However, Nash's proof of existence is nonconstructive. Since 60's, mathematicians and computer scientists have been studying the complexity and algorithms of computing Nash equilibrium and its related questions. On the algorithmic side, people focus on bimatrix game, which is the simplest case of normal form game. It is well known [2] that Nash equilibria of a zero-sum bimatrix game can be solved by linear programming. Lemke and Howson [3] designed an algorithm, named after them as LH algorithm, to compute Nash equilibria for general bimatrix games based on a special pivoting method. However, it is showed [4] that LH algorithm may need to take exponential steps to find a Nash equilibrium in the worst case. On the complexity side, Papadimitriou [5] first showed that computing a Nash equilibrium is in PPAD in 1994. In 2005, there was a big breakthrough in this area. Papadimitriou et. al. [7] showed that computing a Nash equilibrium is indeed PPAD-complete for 4 players game. Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng [8] later showed that computing a Nash equilibrium even for 2 players game is also PPAD-complete, which is quite surprising. Furthermore, computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in the order of Θ(1/n) [6] still remains to PPAD-complete. Besides the set of results concerning about computing an arbitrary Nash equilibrium, some researchers also studied complexity of determining certain properties of Nash equilibria. Conitzer et. al. [9] and Gilboa et. al. [11] showed that it is NP-complete to decide whether a game has more than one Nash equilibrium as well as decide whether there is a Nash equilibrium that gives players a certain payoff. Codenotti et. al. [10] further extended these results to (0, 1) bimatrix games. Recently, people begin to study the relationship between two different games. Gabarró et. al. [12] defined Game Isomorphism between two games that preserves certain properties such as utility function, preference, partial structure of Nash equilibria etc. of the games under permutations. They showed that it is in general computational hard to decide the isomorphism of two games.
In this paper, we study the relationship between two games in a similar spirit of [12] , but we want to address a specific question: whether two games share a common Nash equilibrium, which is called weakly similar, or whether they have exactly the same set of Nash equilibria, which is called strongly similar. We will study the computational aspects of these two questions. It is motivated from several folds. First, we can consider the set of Nash equilibria as the spectrum of a game as the eigenvalues to a matrix. Two matrices that share the same set of eigenvalues are similar. In game theory, it would be natural and mathematically interesting to develop such a similarity concept. Second, when we want to compute a Nash equilibrium of a game that could be computational hard, we may try to transform it to a relatively easier game that share some Nash equilibria with the original game. Thus, it is quite natural to ask the general similarity question as we propose. However, we do not consider permutations in our definition of similarity, which is different from [12] . W.L.O.G, we will focus on bimatrix games in this paper. We show that it is NP-complete to decide whether two bimatrix games share a common Nash Equilibrium while it is co-NP-hard to decide whether two bimatrix games have exactly the same set of Nash equilibria.
Preliminaries
Bimatrix game is the simplest case of normal form game. In a bimatrix game, there are two players called row player and column player respectively. Let Σ R = {r 1 , ..., r m } be the pure strategy space of the row player while Σ R = {c 1 , ..., c n } be the pure strategy space of the column player. We can use two matrices A and B to represent the payoffs to the row player and the column player when they play different combinations of pure strategies. Specifically, when the row player plays r i and the column player plays c j , the payoff to the row player is a ij while the payoff to the column player is b ij . A strategy profile is a probability distribution on the strategy space. Next we would like to define Nash equilibrium following the definition in [6] : [9] showed a bunch of complexity results based on a single reduction from SAT problem to Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. We will make use of their reduction in our paper. Therefore, we formally state their result in the following. Let φ be a boolean formula, V be its variable, L = {±v : v ∈ V } be the set of corresponding literals, and C be the set of clauses. Contitzer et. al., [9] constructed a symmetric bimatrix game G(φ) from φ such that the strategy space Σ of G(φ) is L V C {f } where f is a special pure strategy. They showed the following nice property of G:
.., l n ) satisfies φ, then there is a Nash equilibrium of G(φ) where both players play l i with probability 1 n . The only other Nash equilibrium is the one where both players play f . Basically the theorem says that there is a one-to-one correspondence between mixed strategy NEs of G(φ) and satisfying assignments of φ. The next corollary, although it is not explicitly stated in [9] , follows trivially from theorem 1. Corollary 1 It is NP-complete to decide whether a bimatrix game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Bimatrix Game Similarity
Now we are ready to study the complexity of deciding bimatrix games similarity. First, we formally define the concept of similarity in below. Definition 2 Given two bimatrix games G 1 = (A 1 , B 1 ) and G 2 = (A 2 , B 2 ), if there exists a strategy profile (x, y) such that it is a Nash equilibrium for both G 1 and G 2 , G 1 and G 2 are weakly similar. Furthermore, if G 1 and G 2 have exactly the same set of Nash equilibria, they are strongly similar.
In the next, we show a simple result about deciding whether two bimatrix games share a common mixed strategy NE. Proposition 1 For two bimatrix games G 1 = (A 1 , B 1 ) and G 2 = (A 2 , B 2 ), it is NP-Complete to decide whether they share a common mixed strategy NE.
Proof. Given a strategy profile (x, y), it only takes polynomial time to check whether it is both a mixed strategy NE for G 1 and G 2 . Therefore, it is trivial that the problem is in NP.
In order to prove the NP-hardness of this problem, we first prove the following claim: for two Boolean formula φ 1 and φ 2 , it is NP-complete to decide whether they share a common satisfying assignment. We would like to call this problem COMMON-ASSIGNMENT. We reduce SAT problem, which is well known to be NP-complete, to it. Given a formula φ 1 = i C i where C i is a clause and V is the set of variables of
It is obvious that φ 2 is always satisfied. If φ 1 and φ 2 have a common satisfying assignment, φ 1 has a satisfying assignment. The reverse direction is also true. Thus COMMON-ASSIGNMENT problem is NP-complete. Now, we reduce the COMMON-ASSIGNMENT problem to our problem. Given two formula φ 1 and φ 2 , we transform them to two bimatrix games G(φ 1 ) and G(φ 2 ) respectively using the method in [9] . As shown in [9] , the mixed strategy Nash equilibria of G(φ 1 )(as well as G(φ 2 )) has a one-to-one correspondence with the satisfying assignments of formula φ 1 (as well as φ 2 ). Therefore, if we can decide whether G 1 and G 2 have a common mixed strategy NE, we solve the COMMON-ASSIGNMENT immediately. The result is achieved.
Actually there is a more straightforward proof of proposition 1 by setting G 2 = (E, E) , where E is all one matrix and making use of corollary 1. However, in the proof of next theorem, we need to make use of the COMMON-ASSIGNMENT problem. Therefore, we prove proposition 1 in a little bit complicated way to make the later proofs more clean.
Our target is to show the complexity of deciding the weak similarity of bimatrix games. It can not be harder than the problem of deciding whether two bimatrix games share a common mixed strategy NE given proposition 1. The reason is that it only takes polynomial time to check whether two bimatrix games share a common pure strategy NE. Combining with that fact, an algorithm to solve the problem in proposition 1 can decide the weak similarity problem. Moreover, computing NE of a bimatrix game is known to be PPADcomplete [8] . Thus, we may conjecture that deciding weak similarity of bimatrix games is not NP-hard. The next theorem shows it is indeed NP-complete. But the reduction used in [9] does not work anymore since any two games constructed there always share a common pure strategy NE. We need to bypass that. The main idea of the proof in the following theorem is to modify the matrices G(φ 1 ) and G(φ 2 ) in different ways such that they can not have a common pure strategy NE. Moreover, we should keep the set of mixed strategy NEs of G(φ 1 )(respectively G(φ 2 )) in the modification. Theorem 2 For two bimatrix games G 1 = (A 1 , B 1 ) and G 2 = (A 2 , B 2 ), it is NP-Complete to decide whether they share a common NE, i.e., it is NP-complete to decide whether two bimatrix games are weakly similar.
Proof. Given a strategy profile (x, y), it only takes polynomial time to check whether it is both a NE for G 1 and G 2 . Therefore, it is trivial that the problem is in NP.
In order to prove that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the COMMON-ASSIGNMENT problem to it. Given two formula φ 1 and φ 2 , if they have different set of variables, we just reject them since φ 1 and φ 2 can not have a common good assignment. Otherwise, let V be the same set of variables shared by φ 1 and φ 2 . For a variable v ∈ V , we can add clauses (v −v) to φ 1 and φ 2 in sense of conjunction. As we know, this operation does not change the satisfying property of φ 1 and φ 2 . In this way, we can make sure that the clauses sets of φ 1 and φ 2 have the same size. Then we transform φ 1 and φ 2 to two bimatrix games G(φ 1 ) = (A 1 , B 1 ) and G(φ 2 ) = (A 2 , B 2 ) respectively using the method in [9] . Thus G(φ 1 ) and G(φ 2 ) have the same size of strategies space. We would like to modify the matrices in the following way. Please note that the last row of A 1 (the last column of B 1 because of symmetry) is (1, 1, ...1, 0) T while the last column of A 1 (the last row of B 1 ) is (−2, −2, ..., −2, 0). This special property will play an important role in our reduction. For A 1 and B 1 , we add a vector (0, ..., −1) T to each of them as the last column. Thus we get
and
By the modification, it is obvious that strategy profile ((0, .., 0, 1), (0, ...0, 1, 0)) is the only pure NE for (A 1 , B 1 ) . Furthermore, for any NE (x, y) of (A 1 , B 1 ), the column player does not play the (n + 1)th pure strategy. That is because for any probability vector x T , the (n + 1)th element of x T B 1 is strictly less than the nth element. Therefore ((x 1 , ...x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n , 0) ) is a NE of (A 1 , B 1 ) iff ((x 1 , ...x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n ) ) is a NE of (A 1 , B 1 ) . Thus the mixed strategy NE of (A 1 , B 1 ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the satisfying assignment of φ 1 . For A 2 and B 2 , we add a vector (0, ..., 2) T to each of them as the last column. Thus we get
By the modification, it is obvious that strategy profile ((0, .., 0, 1), (0, ...0, 0, 1)) is the only pure NE for (A 2 , B 2 ). We claim that if ((x 1 , . ..x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n )) is a mixed strategy NE of (A 2 , B 2 ), ((x 1 , . ..x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n , 0)) is a NE of (A 2 , B 2 ). To see this, please note that according to theorem 1, for any mixed strategy NE of (A 2 , B 2 ), the nth element x n must be 0. If we look at x T B 2 , we know that the (n + 1)th strategy of the column player can not be a best response given x. Moreover, (y 1 , ..., y n , 0) gives the column player maximum payoff when the row player plays x. On the other hand, given that the column player plays (y 1 , ..., y n , 0), (x 1 , ...x n ) gives the row player the maximum payoff.
Now we would like to show that φ 1 and φ 2 share a common satisfying assignment iff (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) share a common NE. If φ 1 and φ 2 share a common satisfying assignment, (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) will have a common mixed strategy NE ((x 1 , . ..x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n )). According to our analysis above, (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) should have a common NE ((x 1 , . ..x n ), (y 1 , ..., y n , 0)). For the other direction, if (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) share a common NE (x , y ), it must be a mixed strategy NE since (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) can not have the same pure strategy NE. Moreover, the NE of (A 1 , B 1 ) has a one-to-one correspondence with NE of (A 1 , B 1 ). We know that (x , y ) only takes positive values on literals of φ 1 that give satisfying assignment of φ 1 . Therfore, (x , y ) also only takes positive values on the same set of literals of φ 2 . Thus y n+1 must be 0. Ignoring the last element of y , we get the strategy profile (x, y) and it is a mixed strategy NE of (A 2 , B 2 ). Thus the support of (x, y)(i.e., the support of (x , y )) gives the satisfying assignment of φ 2 . Equivalently, the same set of literals that correspond to the support of (x , y ) give a satisfying assignment to both formula φ 1 and φ 2 . Therefore, if (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) share a common NE, φ 1 and φ 2 share a common satisfying assignment. The theorem is achieved.
Conitzer et. al. [9] showed that it is #P -hard to count the number of Nash equilibria. If we can enumerate all the Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game, for sure, we can decide whether two bimatrix games are weakly similar. Theorem 2 shows that deciding weak similarity seems to be easier than enumerating all the Nash equilibria, which is interesting. Moreover, if we know that one of the two bimatrix game has a unique Nash equilibrium, deciding weak similarity can be solved in PPAD.
The next natural question is what is the complexity to decide whether two bimatrix games are strongly similar. It is well known [13] that given two boolean formula φ 1 and φ 2 , it is co-NP-hard to decide whether the two formula are equivalent. Given the reduction in [9] , there is a one-to-one correspondence between mixed NE of G(φ 1 ) (respectively G(φ 2 )) and satisfying assignments of formula φ 1 (respectively φ 2 ). Therefore, G(φ 1 ) and G(φ 2 ) have the same set of NEs iff φ 1 and φ 2 are equivalent. Thus, Theorem 3 It is co-NP-hard to decide whether two bimatrix games are strongly similar.
Conclusion
Computing a Nash equilibrium of bimatrix game is known to be PPAD-complete [8] while deciding whether a bimatrix game [9, 11] has two Nash equilibria is NP-complete. In this paper, we introduce the concept of bimatrix games similarity and show the complexity of deciding similarity of bimatrix games. These results give us some insights about the complexity class PPAD v.s. NP. PPAD only concerns about the computation of an arbitrary Nash equilibrium. However, the complexity is moved to NP when we ask questions related to the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We regard this work as the first step to understand the relationship between PPAD v.s. NP. Moreover, it is an interesting topic to further explore the computational aspects of studying relationship between two different games.
